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Wilce Magical Laments and Anthropological Reflections

documentation thus brings immortal—permanent—order to
the history-thus-far of the transformation of Kaluli cultural
forms.
But perhaps Wilce is overlooking the centrality of cultural
process—including reproduction with transformation—
which has replaced cultures-as-collectibles in Feld’s (and contemporary anthropology’s) professional voice. As the Bosavi
woman Hane is, tropically, both “mother” (like a midwife
present in earliest life) and “undertaker” to the deceased Bibiali, so also Feld claims not a static position as a modern
collector who both laments the passing of the “traditional”
(of which he offers for sale some of the last samples or specimens) but a dynamic position vis-à-vis a community whose
cultural forms are ever being renewed and transformed. One
would be hard-pressed to see this as a lament; rather, it is a
celebration of renewal. If it is interdiscursive with the tropes
of Hane’s lament, perhaps the lesson ought to be that the
concept of “lament” might be rethought functionally, as much
as scholars like Wilce have looked at its structural or formal
semiotic modalities. Might we not take lament, then, as the
culturally normative, even effective ritual poesis for overcoming and transforming what would otherwise threaten to be,
indeed, Freudian melancholia, for the lamenter as for others
on whose behalf (s)he sings?
And perhaps anthropological discourse, too, is more than
mere lamentation in that older conceptualization and has
some performative value in suggesting, even fostering paths
of possible transformed vitality for the diversity of local forms
of cultural process.

Claudia Strauss
Department of Anthropology, Pitzer College, Claremant,
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Wilce draws our attention to the formulaic nature of anthropologists’ ethnographies, both considered as a distinctive
genre and as inflected by larger modernist discourses of destruction and loss (which he terms “neolament”). His intriguing discussion of the laments that end many anthropological
texts helped me to recognize similar laments that I heard when
I conducted interviews in the Piedmont region of North Carolina. The latter examples raise issues about the politics of
lamenting modernity and questions about what makes a lament effective.
The (neo)laments I heard were for changes in family and
community life. The following comments, for example, were
repeated, with only slightly changed wording, by several of
my interviewees: “People are apathetic now. Kids come home
to empty houses. Parents come home, everything’s in an uproar. Kids go to bed, they watch TV, they’ve got televisions
in their rooms, they got games like Nintendo. There is no
sense of unity anymore”(“Catlyn Dwyer,” a disabled office
manager). For one interviewee who grew up in the mountains
of North Carolina (“Jack Allen,” an unskilled laborer), these
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changes in family life were related to materialism and a faster
pace of life:
Every time you turn on TV, your top stories, you hear
something about a child being molested or somebody abusing a child or somebody just—drive-by shootings. And it’s
just, to me it’s just, we’ve got away from our basic values,
more or less—our home and our families and what’s most
important. It seems to me like nowadays it’s just, it’s out
there, you know, you’ve got to make a living, you’ve got to
make that money, and this is the easiest way to do it, computer games and this, that, and the other. Kids come home
and they eat cold cereal or they grab a quick snack or something like that and the parents come in and “Oh, don’t
bother me, I’m busy, I’ve got—.” They bring their work
home with them and it’s just—to me, that’s not a good
society. [ . . . ] If we could go BACK, I think if we could
go back, even though the times and the money and all that—
but if we could go back and live like that, I think society
would be a lot better off—if they didn’t have all these . . .
computers and fast cars. [ . . . ] My parents tried to give
me a better life, I tried to give my kids a better life, they
try to give their kids a better life. And by the time their kids
get grown, life probably won’t even be WORTH anything,
as far as that goes.

“Marvin Frederick,” a factory middle manager, provided
very detailed images of the loss of small-town Gemeinschaft:
Looking back from today’s standards, back to where we were
when I was younger, we were poor. And the things that I
think about are the old men sitting around chewing tobacco
on the porch and talking about whose garden, who’s got
the best garden, who’s got the biggest tomatoes, and things
of that nature. And I look at it nowadays, and we don’t
even know our neighbors. We don’t know who lives next
door. We can’t even decide what we’re going to have for
supper without getting into a conflict of “What do you
want?” “Well, I don’t know, you decide.” “I don’t want to
decide.” My question is how did we get from where we
were, when we were poor and enjoying it? I mean, it was
fun to sit around and do that. Now, having some money
or having a better life, so to speak, how did we get here,
and was it worth the trip?

Wilce comments about the “needs of our generation for
hopeful . . . instead of tragic endings,” but these modern
Americans always ended on a pessimistic note.
On the surface, such formulaic, frequently repeated comments seem a prime example of what Wilce and the commentators he cites call “failed, ineffectual, or perpetual
mourning” because it has no closure. But as observers of
cultural politics in the contemporary United States, we can
see that some rhetorical criticisms of modern family life, in
particular, have fueled very effective social movements that
are blocking access to contraception, abortion, and gay mar-
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riage. And what should our stance be as commentators upon
such discourse, when implicit in all of the above comments,
for example, is a critique of families in which both parents
have demanding jobs? I would like to see Wilce address the
politics of nostalgia and how anthropologists should write
about it. I appreciated his final note of hope (in the required
optative mood) that “ ‘wholesome’ mourning . . . can play a
role in establishing more egalitarian futures,” but how do we
sort the “wholesome” from the reactionary? Our joining as
participant observers in such mourning will not necessarily
lead to more egalitarian futures.

Alexandre Surrallés
Laboratoire d’Anthropologic Sociale (CNRS), Collège de
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Wilce proposes extrapolating a theory developed for analyzing
the “traditional lament” to address the laments that texts and
other anthropological productions express on the subject of
modernity’s destructiveness. The theory for analyzing the
“traditional lament” as a ritual act is very suggestive and offers
novel clues on how to address a phenomenon which, despite
its significance and recurrence, has not generated many analytical essays. The application of this theory to the anthropological literature is, however, much less convincing. Wilce
moves parsimoniously from the establishment of ritual as
language to the establishment of a model of the anthropological text as ritual activity through the role of the anthropologist in the rituals observed, but he does so at the expense
of generalizing concepts, with even the very notion of ritual
losing all content in the end. Projecting the ritual of the
traditional lament onto all lamentation and the lamentations
in anthropological texts onto anthropological production and
cultural production in general results in the conclusion that
everything is ritual. This is “lamentable” loss for a concept
that has been useful for circumscribing very specific phenomena and could continue to be of use if it is not extracted from
the intellectual context from which it emanates (e.g., Houseman and Severi 1998; Surrallés 2003)—unless Wilce has a
world of pure reflexes, trivialized by constructivism, in mind
and is inspired by Nietzsche’s assertion that “we believe that
we know something about the things themselves when we
talk of trees, colours, snow and flowers; and yet we possess
nothing but metaphors for things—metaphors which correspond in no way to the original entities” (1975, 283). Perhaps
also in a metaphorical sense, Wilce compares the “traditional
lament” with the lament over “modernity’s destructiveness”
in texts written by anthropologists, two forms of expression
whose specificity dissolves—as in the case of the notion of
ritual—when they are placed on the same level. His call for
anthropological production to be treated as a subject of study
is paradoxical and not very original. If there is one thing to
be learned from anthropology, it is that alterity is the best

reflection of oneself. Anthropology’s best mirror is a corollary
of the work for which it was instituted. One of the most
recent “laments” expressed by Claude Lévi-Strauss decades
after the publication of Tristes Tropiques (see Viveiros de Castro 1998) is his recognition that the anthropology that he
helped to develop, like all the anthropology that was practiced
at the time, was inherited from a history hinged on the expansion of the West. Anthropology emerged as a discipline
in the nineteenth century, the effort of a civilization that was
technically superior to all others and sought to understand
the societies that it was believed to dominate. Lévi-Strauss
believes that this is no longer the case. To illustrate this idea
he compares the evolution of anthropology with the evolution
of musical composition. Anthropology as he knew it was tonal
and has now become serial. Because our society or, rather,
the values on which our society is based have become weak
and because other societies have followed our path, societies
do not possess absolute foundations: they exist in relation to
one another like the notes of a dodecaphonic system. The
outcome is a different anthropology, just as tonal music is
different from serial music (Viveiros de Castro 1998, 120–21).
It is a polyphonic and atonal anthropology that Wilce’s mirror, as if still composed in C major, a product of a closed
circle of academics observing the peoples of the world, seems
to obviate. When he says that turning the concept of ritual
toward “ourselves” is not difficult, when he proposes that
“we” practice the mourning of destruction, when he talks
about anthropological rituals that transform “our” institutional life as professionals, when he refers to Frazer’s tribe,
he should specify who “we” refers to. This reflection of LéviStrauss reminds us that anthropology has become an instrument of analysis employed by communities whose institutional,
geographical, and intellectual origins, thematic interests, and
political agendas make it unlikely to be suspected of responsibility for its past and for the constitution of modernity. The
“egalitarian futures” to which Wilce aspires are found not in
narcissistic reflection about the vestiges of an outgrown anthropology but in the recognition of alterity within the discipline itself as the best way of expiating the destructiveness of
modernity, at least as far as intellectual imperialism is concerned.
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Ritual, as Wilce observes, is commonly associated with the
nonmodern and the nonrational. Therefore, the suggestion
that anthropologists who perceive themselves as modern or
postmodern and rational are unknowingly engaging in ritual
acts may easily be interpreted as an insult. I am sure that
Wilce does not intend to insult those anthropologists, in-
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